grapheme-breaker
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 4308 days old, predating Sigstore provenance; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.3.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 4 |
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.