git-user-name
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:parse-git-config | AI (dependencies): parse-git-config is a purpose-appropriate dependency from the same publisher ecosystem; its use here is stable and expected for git config parsing. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by years; absence is expected and not a security signal for this well-established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.2.1 | 5 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 0 |
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.