gifsicle
gifsicle wrapper that makes it seamlessly available as a local dependency
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from 1000ch to sindresorhus in 2021 is a well-documented legitimate maintainer handoff; sindresorhus is a highly trusted npm publisher with a strong track record. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): gifsicle is a native binary wrapper; postinstall fetching/building the gifsicle binary is the documented and expected install flow for this package, stable across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established imagemin ecosystem package; lack of Sigstore provenance is a hygiene gap but not a security risk for this well-known publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 31 of 31)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.0.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 7.0.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 6.1.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 6.0.3 | 3 / 5 | |
| 6.0.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 5.3.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 5.2.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 5.2.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 5.1.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 5.0.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 4.0.1 | 4 / 5 | |
| 4.0.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 3.0.4 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.3 | 3 / 5 | |
| 3.0.2 | 3 / 5 | |
| 3.0.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 3.0.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 2.0.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.0.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.0.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.7 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 6 / 0 |
v7.0.1
2 findingsScript: node lib/install.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-11-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.