gh-changelog
generate github changelog into md file
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Package is 4200 days old with 6 versions and an established publisher. Short README and inflated semver are cosmetic issues, not spam/malware indicators. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:request | AI (dependencies): The `request` package is a well-known HTTP library appropriate for a GitHub API client tool; no security concern for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Package is 11+ years old with very low download volume; infrequent publishing is consistent with a lightly-maintained utility, not an account takeover signal. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:commander | AI (phantom-deps): Declared but unused dependency; code quality issue only, not a security concern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:modulex-html-parser | AI (phantom-deps): Declared but unused dependency; code quality issue only, not a security concern for this package. | ai |
v1.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.