getobject
get.and.set.deep.objects.easily = true
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from tkellen to vladikoff is a documented legitimate transfer; cowboy (original author) is also added as maintainer, confirming authorized handoff. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers cowboy (original author) and vladikoff (established publisher) reflect a legitimate ownership transfer, not a compromise. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 4 |
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.