get-prototype-of
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Package is ~11 years old with an approved dependency edge; sparse metadata reflects early npm era norms, not malicious intent. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Version 0.0.0 is the only version and has been stable for ~11 years; not indicative of a throwaway malicious package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Missing description is consistent with early npm publishing norms for this package's age. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.0.0
2 findingsMatched 6 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_README_NO_CODE] Short README with no code block, no install instructions, and no usage/API section. • [S_DESC_MATCHES_NAME] Description is empty or just restates the package name. • [S_NO_REPO_NO_HOME] No repository, homepage, or bugs URL — genuine packages almost always link somewhere. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 1 code file(s), 1623 bytes total.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.