get-monorepo-packages
Get a list of packages from a monorepo
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:azz | AI (email-domain): The author field uses '@azz' as a social handle, not a real email address. The analyzer is misinterpreting a Twitter/social handle as an email domain. This is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 7 |
v1.3.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '@azz' uses domain 'azz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.