gel
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:got | AI (typosquat): gel is the official Gel DB client, not a typosquat of 'got'; stable FP. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:magic.io | AI (email-domain): Legacy maintainer email; publisher 1st1 is the known Gel/EdgeDB maintainer. | ai |
v2.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.