gear-lib
Collection of common Gear.js tasks
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:vendor/uglify.js | AI (source-diff): vendor/uglify.js is a legitimate vendored copy of the well-known UglifyJS library (BSD license, by Mihai Bazon). Long lines are expected minified output from a JS compressor tool, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:vendor/uglify.js | AI (source-diff): UglifyJS is a code transformation tool; dynamic code execution patterns are intrinsic to its function as a JS parser/compressor. No actual network+exec dropper behavior present. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is entirely explained by the addition of the vendored uglify.js (152KB), a legitimate well-known library. No injected payload. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:handlebars | AI (dependencies): Handlebars is a well-known Yahoo/Mustache templating library; its use in a Yahoo build tooling package is expected and benign. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require is an intentional plugin-loader pattern in gear-lib, iterating over known task names from a fixed path. Not user-controlled; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 5087 days old with 43 versions; lack of Sigstore provenance is expected for this era/workflow and not a security risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.2 | 11 / 5 | |
| 0.8.3 | 8 / 2 | |
| 0.7.9 | 8 / 2 | |
| 0.7.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 0.6.1 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.6.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.4.2 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.4.1 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.1.4 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.1.3 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.1.2 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.1.1 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.0.6 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.0.5 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.0.4 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.0.2 | 7 / 2 |
v0.9.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.