fumadocs-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@fuma-translate/react | AI (phantom-deps): First-party dep from same author; used via export map, not a direct import in source files. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Package has many export entries; file count reflects normal build output restructuring. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/mdx-plugins/transformer-icon.js | AI (source-diff): Long lines are inline SVG path data, not obfuscation. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/rehype-code.core-Doda41P7.js | AI (source-diff): Standard bundled/minified build output for this docs framework; content is readable shiki/rehype plugin code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/rehype-code.core-Cz33III3.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript output (shiki/rehype pipeline); long lines are rollup artifacts, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/rehype-code.core-D2jcAuJI.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsdown bundle output; long lines are minified but readable source — not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): tinyglobby is a well-known glob utility; addition is consistent with a major version bump. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/rehype-code.core-CyhJRC1n.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled ESM build output with readable content; minification is expected for this docs library. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Active package with 305 versions and SLSA attestation; dormancy likely reflects release cadence, not takeover. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@shikijs/rehype | AI (dependencies): @shikijs/rehype is the official Shiki rehype plugin; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:npm-to-yarn | AI (dependencies): npm-to-yarn is a well-known utility; stable false positive for this docs framework. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@orama/orama | AI (dependencies): @orama/orama is a legitimate open-source search engine library; its use is consistent with fumadocs-core's search features. | ai |
Versions (showing 50 of 50)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 17.0.0 | 19 / 29 | |
| 16.10.3 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.10.2 | 18 / 32 | |
| 16.10.1 | 18 / 32 | |
| 16.10.0 | 18 / 32 | |
| 16.9.3 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.9.2 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.9.1 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.9.0 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.12 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.11 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.10 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.8 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.7 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.6 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.5 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.4 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.3 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.2 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.1 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.8.0 | 17 / 32 | |
| 16.7.16 | 17 / 30 | |
| 16.7.15 | 17 / 30 | |
| 16.7.14 | 18 / 30 | |
| 16.7.13 | 18 / 30 | |
| 16.7.12 | 23 / 25 | |
| 16.7.11 | 23 / 25 | |
| 16.7.10 | 23 / 25 | |
| 16.7.9 | 23 / 25 | |
| 16.7.8 | 23 / 25 | |
| 16.5.1 | 19 / 29 | |
| 16.2.1 | 18 / 26 | |
| 16.2.0 | 18 / 26 | |
| 16.1.0 | 18 / 26 | |
| 16.0.15 | 18 / 26 | |
| 16.0.14 | 18 / 26 | |
| 16.0.13 | 18 / 26 | |
| 16.0.12 | 18 / 26 | |
| 16.0.11 | 18 / 26 | |
| 16.0.10 | 18 / 26 | |
| 16.0.9 | 18 / 25 | |
| 16.0.8 | 18 / 25 | |
| 16.0.7 | 18 / 25 | |
| 16.0.6 | 17 / 25 | |
| 16.0.5 | 17 / 25 | |
| 16.0.4 | 17 / 25 | |
| 16.0.3 | 17 / 25 | |
| 16.0.2 | 17 / 25 | |
| 16.0.1 | 17 / 25 | |
| 16.0.0 | 17 / 25 |
v17.0.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.10.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.10.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.9.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.9.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (sonmoosans) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-04-19, but sonmoosans is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v16.7.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.7.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.7.14
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.7.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.7.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.7.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.7.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.7.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.7.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.5.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.