full-icu
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Postinstall downloads ICU data files; documented and expected for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): env-spread passes process.env + NODE_ICU_DATA to child process; not exfiltration, standard pattern for this tool. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process used to spawn ICU install; core functionality of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.0 | 1 / 8 |
v1.5.0
3 findingsScript: node postinstall.js
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/nodejs/full-icu-npm/blob/e614544451f0fb2818e57fb0bacaa81288897c48/node-full-icu.js#L5 3 | const data = require('./full-icu') 4 | const env = data.icu_small > 5 | ? { 6 | ...process.env, 7 | NODE_ICU_DATA: data.datPath()
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.