foreach
foreach component + npm package
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:takimata.ch | AI (email-domain): Package is 13+ years old with no install scripts or runtime code risk. Domain takeover is a theoretical future risk, not an active exploit in this already-published version. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): foreach is a minimal, long-established utility package (4781 days old). Missing repo/keywords/deps reflects its age and simplicity, not spam or malicious intent. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Old, established package published long before Sigstore provenance existed; absence of provenance is expected and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 2.0.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 2.0.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2.0.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.3.3 | 0 / 0 |
v2.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.5
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'takimata.ch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'takimata.ch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'takimata.ch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'takimata.ch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'takimata.ch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'takimata.ch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.3
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'takimata.ch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.