extended
Library for combining multiple libraries into one
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): Usage is in an example browser script and creates an empty base constructor via new Function() with no arguments — a standard OOP pattern, not dynamic code execution of untrusted input. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 4845 days old, predating Sigstore provenance on npm. Absence is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 3 |
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.