expo-file-system
Provides access to the local file system on the device.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Canary releases from expo-bot's automated pipeline may omit gitHead; all other metadata matches the legitimate expo/expo repository and publisher track record is strong. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | suspicious-version-number | AI (publish-pattern): Canary version numbering pattern is standard for the Expo ecosystem; not indicative of malicious intent for this well-established package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Expo monorepo package with a highly trusted publisher track record; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers (douglowder, betoatexpo, philpl, expo-bot) are all associated with the Expo organization; expo-bot is a known Expo automation account. Legitimate team evolution. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): expo-file-system is a legitimate, well-established Expo SDK package with 285 versions. The v0.0.1 stub signals are artifacts of an early placeholder release ~8 years ago, not spam or malice. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): brentvatne is a core Expo team member with a strong track record (211 approved, 0 rejected). Publisher rotation within the Expo org is expected and not a risk signal. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer changes within the Expo organization are routine team restructuring; no external actors involved. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): The raw IP (192.168.0.1) appears only in a JSDoc comment as a usage example for uploadAsync — it is documentation, not live network code. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 193)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 56.0.7 | 0 / 4 | |
| 56.0.6 | 0 / 4 | |
| 56.0.5 | 0 / 4 | |
| 56.0.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 56.0.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 56.0.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 56.0.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 56.0.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 55.0.22 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.21 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.20 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.19 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.18 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.17 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.16 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.15 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.14 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.13 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.12 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.11 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.10 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.9 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.8 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.7 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 55.0.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.23 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.22 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.21 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.20 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.19 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.18 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.17 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.16 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.15 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.14 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.13 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.12 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.11 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.10 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.9 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.8 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.7 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 19.0.4 | 0 / 2 |
v56.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v55.0.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v55.0.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v55.0.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v55.0.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v55.0.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v19.0.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v19.0.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.