execa
Process execution for humans
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): execa is a major OSS library; gaps between major versions are normal. sindresorhus is the original trusted author; dormancy pattern is not indicative of takeover here. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): ehmicky is the documented, long-standing maintainer of execa since 2019; this is a legitimate transition from sindresorhus, not a compromise. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dependencies are established packages; growth is consistent with feature expansion in mature library. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance attestation is a best-practice gap, not a security defect. Stable for this established package. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): 6.9x growth is expected for major version with new features and 112 new source files. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): 112 new files are consistent with major version expansion; no evidence of injected code. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher transition from sindresorhus to ehmicky on 2023-08-19 is documented and ehmicky has strong approval history; appears to be legitimate maintainer handoff. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:figures | AI (dependencies): figures is a legitimate terminal UI utility; stable dependency for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:onetime | AI (dependencies): onetime is an established utility package; its addition to execa is a legitimate dependency for process lifecycle management. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-spawn | AI (semgrep): Spawning child processes is the primary function of execa; this is expected behavior. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Spreading process.env is standard for a process execution library that passes environment to child processes; documented behavior. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): execa's core purpose is process execution; child_process import is fundamental and expected for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 39 of 39)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.6.1 | 12 / 14 | |
| 9.6.0 | 12 / 14 | |
| 9.5.3 | 12 / 14 | |
| 9.5.2 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.5.1 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.5.0 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.4.1 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.4.0 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.3.1 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.3.0 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.2.0 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.1.0 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.0.2 | 12 / 13 | |
| 9.0.1 | 12 / 12 | |
| 9.0.0 | 12 / 12 | |
| 8.0.1 | 9 / 10 | |
| 3.0.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.0.3 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.0.1 | 8 / 9 | |
| 2.0.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 1.0.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.11.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.10.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.9.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.8.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.7.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.6.3 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.6.2 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.6.1 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.6.0 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.5.1 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.5.0 | 6 / 7 | |
| 0.4.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.2.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.2.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 2 |
v9.6.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v9.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-05-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v9.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-10-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.0.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-07-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.0.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-06-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-06-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.