espree
An Esprima-compatible JavaScript parser built on Acorn
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:lib/syntax.js | AI (source-diff): lib/syntax.js contains long Unicode regex character classes common in esprima-derived parsers. The file has proper copyright headers and is clearly legitimate source code, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): espree is a long-established package (4155 days old) from a highly trusted publisher; lack of Sigstore provenance is expected for this era of publishing. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): ESLint's transition to OpenJS Foundation (eslintbot/openjsfoundation) is a documented, legitimate organizational move. SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD publishing integrity. Stable for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): eslint-visitor-keys is a first-party ESLint package; adding it as a dependency is expected and benign for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): eslintbot is ESLint org's official CI publishing account; the transition from 'eslint' to 'eslintbot' is a documented organizational workflow change, not a compromise. SLSA provenance confirms CI/CD publishing. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): openjsfoundation and eslintbot are the ESLint org's governance and automation accounts; addition reflects legitimate organizational structure under OpenJS Foundation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of individual maintainers (eslint, ivolodin) in favor of org-level accounts is consistent with ESLint's transition to bot-based publishing; not indicative of takeover. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:acorn-jsx | AI (dependencies): acorn-jsx is a long-standing, well-known dependency of espree for JSX parsing support; its presence is expected and stable across all espree versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 88 of 88)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.2.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 11.1.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 11.1.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 11.0.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 10.4.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 10.3.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 10.2.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 10.1.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 10.0.1 | 3 / 16 | |
| 10.0.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 9.6.1 | 3 / 17 | |
| 9.6.0 | 3 / 17 | |
| 9.5.2 | 3 / 17 | |
| 9.5.1 | 3 / 17 | |
| 9.5.0 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.4.1 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.4.0 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.3.3 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.3.2 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.3.1 | 3 / 20 | |
| 9.3.0 | 3 / 20 | |
| 9.2.0 | 3 / 20 | |
| 9.1.0 | 3 / 20 | |
| 9.0.0 | 3 / 20 | |
| 8.0.0 | 3 / 20 | |
| 7.3.1 | 3 / 16 | |
| 7.3.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 7.2.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 7.1.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 7.0.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 6.2.1 | 3 / 16 | |
| 6.2.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 6.1.2 | 3 / 16 | |
| 6.1.1 | 3 / 16 | |
| 6.1.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 6.0.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 5.0.1 | 3 / 16 | |
| 5.0.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 4.1.0 | 3 / 15 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.5.4 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.5.3 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.5.2 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.5.1 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.5.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.4.3 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.4.2 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.4.1 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.4.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.3.2 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.3.1 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.1.7 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.1.6 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.1.5 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 16 | |
| 2.2.5 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.2.4 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.2.3 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.2.2 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.2.1 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.2.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.0.4 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.0.3 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.12.3 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.12.2 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.12.1 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.12.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.11.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.10.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.9.1 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.9.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.8.1 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.8.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.7.1 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.7.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.6.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.5.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 1.4.0 | 0 / 17 | |
| 1.3.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 1.3.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 1.2.2 | 0 / 9 |
v11.1.1
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (eslint, ivolodin, nzakas) were replaced by new maintainers (openjsfoundation, eslintbot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.1.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (eslint, ivolodin, nzakas) were replaced by new maintainers (openjsfoundation, eslintbot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (eslint, ivolodin, nzakas) were replaced by new maintainers (openjsfoundation, eslintbot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.4.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (eslint, ivolodin, nzakas) were replaced by new maintainers (openjsfoundation, eslintbot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.3.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (eslint, ivolodin, nzakas) were replaced by new maintainers (openjsfoundation, eslintbot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (eslint, ivolodin, nzakas) were replaced by new maintainers (openjsfoundation, eslintbot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-09-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (eslint, ivolodin, nzakas) were replaced by new maintainers (openjsfoundation, eslintbot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-06-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-02-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-10-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.5.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-09-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-09-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-09-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-07-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.