eslint-find-rules
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): The dynamic require loads process.cwd()/package.json to find the project's main entry — a standard, safe pattern for ESLint tooling that inspects the current project. Not arbitrary module loading. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package from highly trusted publisher ljharb; absence of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.0.0 | 5 / 26 | |
| 4.2.0 | 5 / 21 | |
| 4.1.0 | 6 / 22 | |
| 4.0.0 | 6 / 22 |
v5.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.