eslint-config-turbo
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from turbobot to GitHub Actions reflects CI/CD change within Vercel org; SLSA attested. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:eslint-plugin-turbo | AI (dependencies): eslint-plugin-turbo is the sibling package from the same Vercel/Turborepo monorepo; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 55)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.9.16 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.15 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.14 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.12 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.11 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.10 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.9 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.8 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.7 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.6 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.21 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.20 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.19 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.18 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.17 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.16 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.15 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.14 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.13 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.12 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.11 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.10 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.9 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.8 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.7 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.6 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.8.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.8.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.8.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.7.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.7.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.7.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.7.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.7.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.7.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.7.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.6.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.6.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.6.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.6.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.5.8 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.5.7 | 1 / 7 |
v2.9.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.5.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.