es6-symbol
ECMAScript 6 Symbol polyfill
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): The new dep 'ext' is authored by the same maintainer (medikoo) as es6-symbol, replacing es5-ext in a routine internal refactor. No supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:d | AI (dependencies): Package `d` is a well-known utility by the same publisher (medikoo) with a long history; not a risk for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:ext | AI (dependencies): Package `ext` is a well-known utility by the same publisher (medikoo) with a long history; not a risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 12+ years old, predates Sigstore provenance. High download volume and trusted publisher make this a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 2 / 1 |
v3.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.