ee-first
return the first event in a set of ee/event pairs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from jongleberry to dougwilson (both Express core maintainers) in 2014; well-established and stable. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 1 |
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-08-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-08-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.