edge-launcher
Launcher for the Microsoft Edge browser.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): The bundled Win32/MicrosoftEdgeLauncher.exe is the core artifact of this official Microsoft Edge launcher package; its presence is expected and legitimate across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance infrastructure; absence of attestation is expected for this long-established Microsoft-authored package. | ai |
v1.2.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/x86/MicrosoftEdgeLauncher.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • Win32/MicrosoftEdgeLauncher.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.