duplexer3
Modern version of `duplexer2`
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transfer from floatdrop to sindresorhus is a legitimate, well-documented maintainer transition. Repo URL in package.json confirms the transfer. Sindresorhus is a highly trusted publisher. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Addition of sindresorhus as maintainer reflects the same legitimate transfer; no risk generalizes across future versions under this trusted publisher. | ai |
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-07-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.