dirty
A tiny & fast key value store with append-only disk log. Ideal for apps with < 1 million records.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Transfer to younggi occurred in January 2014 (~11 years ago). Publisher has 17 approved packages, clean history, and no material changes have been introduced. Long-settled transition, not an active hijack. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of original maintainers is part of the same 2014 transfer event. No evidence of malicious activity over 11+ years of subsequent releases. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Missing metadata (repo URL, keywords) and small main file are characteristic of older npm packages from this era, not indicators of malicious intent. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer additions (felixge, bentaber, distracteddev) are part of the same 2016 legitimate transition; no evidence of compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from younggi to felixge occurred in 2016; felixge is a well-established npm publisher with strong track record. Transition is 8+ years old with no subsequent issues. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require() fires on benchmark/test configuration code (config.LIB_DIRTY) used to load the library under test. This is a stable, benign pattern in this package's benchmark suite, not a production code risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 15+ years old with a strong track record; lack of Sigstore provenance is expected for packages of this vintage and does not indicate risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.3 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.9.9 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.9.8 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.9.7 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.9.6 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.9.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.9.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.9.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.0 | 1 / 0 |
v1.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-07-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.8
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (felixge, bentaber, distracteddev) were replaced by new maintainers (younggi). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.9.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.