directory-encoder
Encode a directory of images to CSS
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): fs-extra is a well-known, legitimate Node.js filesystem utility with no malicious history; its addition is consistent with the package's purpose of encoding directories of images. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:handlebars | AI (dependencies): Handlebars is used for CSS template rendering in this image encoder tool, not for processing untrusted input. Package is 4521 days old with this dependency pinned throughout its history; risk is acceptable in context. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 12+ years old, predates Sigstore provenance. Established publisher with clean track record; lack of provenance is expected and not a security concern here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash | AI (phantom-deps): lodash is declared as a runtime dependency in package.json; phantom-dep flag is a code hygiene issue, not a security risk for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): All new maintainers (filamentgroup-admin, zachleat, scottjehl, etc.) are Filament Group affiliates — the original author org. This is an internal team account reorganization, not a hostile takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by a no-code-change release is consistent with team account reorganization rather than opportunistic hijack. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are all Filament Group employees/accounts; legitimate internal transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removed maintainers (filamentgroup, jefflembeck, jlembeck) replaced by org-affiliated accounts; consistent with account consolidation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): zachleat is a known Filament Group developer; publisher change reflects internal team reorganization, not compromise. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.9.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.9.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.8.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.8.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.7.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.7.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.7.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.6.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.6.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.5.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.3.7 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.6 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 4 |
v0.9.2
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (filamentgroup, jefflembeck, jlembeck) were replaced by new maintainers (filamentgroup-admin, johnmbender, maggiewachs, scottjehl, zachleat). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-06-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.