dexie
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/dfahlander | AI (email-domain): Author field contains a GitHub profile URL, not an email; DNS check on it is a false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.4.3 | 0 / 27 | |
| 4.4.2 | 0 / 27 | |
| 4.4.1 | 0 / 26 | |
| 4.4.0 | 0 / 26 | |
| 4.3.0 | 0 / 26 | |
| 4.2.1 | 0 / 26 | |
| 4.2.0 | 0 / 26 |
v4.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.2
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/dfahlander' uses domain 'https://github.com/dfahlander' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.