← Home

detect-port

Node.js implementation of port detector

32
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

fengmk2xudafengziczhu

Keywords

detectport

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): fengmk2 is a co-maintainer in the node-modules org that owns detect-port; legitimate transition within the same team. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Lack of Sigstore provenance is a hygiene gap, not a security risk for this well-established package. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/esm/bin/detect-port.js AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled ESM output via tshy; readable code, not obfuscated. Standard for this package's build pipeline. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/commonjs/bin/detect-port.js AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output via tshy; readable code, not obfuscated. Standard for this package's build pipeline. ai
source-diff source-size-tripled AI (source-diff): Size increase from adding dual CJS/ESM dist outputs + TypeScript declarations via tshy build. Expected for TS rewrite. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/esm/detect-port.js AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled ESM output via tshy; readable code, not obfuscated. Standard for this package's build pipeline. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/commonjs/detect-port.js AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output via tshy; readable code, not obfuscated. Standard for this package's build pipeline. ai

Versions (showing 32 of 32)

Version Deps Published
2.1.0 1 / 12
2.0.1 1 / 12
2.0.0 1 / 12
1.6.1 2 / 8
1.6.0 1 / 7
1.5.1 2 / 9
1.5.0 2 / 9
1.4.1 2 / 9
1.4.0 2 / 9
1.3.0 2 / 8
1.2.3 2 / 8
1.2.2 2 / 7
1.2.1 2 / 7
1.2.0 2 / 7
1.1.4 2 / 7
1.1.3 2 / 7
1.1.2 2 / 6
1.1.1 1 / 6
1.1.0 1 / 5
1.0.7 0 / 7
1.0.6 0 / 7
1.0.5 0 / 8
1.0.4 0 / 7
1.0.3 0 / 7
1.0.2 0 / 7
1.0.1 1 / 5
1.0.0 1 / 5
0.1.4 2 / 5
0.1.3 2 / 5
0.1.2 1 / 5
0.1.1 1 / 5
0.1.0 2 / 5

v2.1.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.0.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.0.0

5 findings
HIGH New obfuscated file: dist/commonjs/bin/detect-port.js source-diff

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

HIGH New obfuscated file: dist/commonjs/detect-port.js source-diff

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

HIGH New obfuscated file: dist/esm/bin/detect-port.js source-diff

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

HIGH New obfuscated file: dist/esm/detect-port.js source-diff

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.6.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: xudafeng → fengmk2 (on 2024-05-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: xudafeng → fengmk2 (on 2024-05-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.5.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.0

2 findings
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: xudafeng → fengmk2 (on 2022-09-21) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-09-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.4.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.0

2 findings
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: fengmk2 → xudafeng (on 2022-09-21) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-09-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.3.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.2.3

2 findings
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: xudafeng → fengmk2 (on 2018-05-16) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-05-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.2.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.2.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.2.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.4

2 findings
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: fengmk2 → xudafeng (on 2017-06-06) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-06-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.1.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.1

2 findings
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: xudafeng → fengmk2 (on 2017-03-17) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.7

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.6

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.5

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.4

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.0

2 findings
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: ziczhu → xudafeng (on 2016-08-01) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-08-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.