destroy
destroy a stream if possible
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from jongleberry to dougwilson (both Express.js core maintainers) in 2016; stable for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): dougwilson is a listed contributor and long-standing Express ecosystem maintainer; addition is legitimate and stable. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 8 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 8 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 8 | |
| 1.0.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 2 |
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.