deputy
caching layer for detective
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Package is from substack (James Halliday), a highly trusted long-standing npm author. Version 0.0.0 reflects early publishing conventions, not malicious intent. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is over 14 years old, predating Sigstore provenance. No provenance is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 2 / 1 |
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.