deglob
Take a list of glob patterns and return an array of file locations, respecting `.gitignore` and allowing for ignore patterns via `package.json`.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore; published by highly trusted feross. No-provenance is expected and stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.1 | 6 / 3 | |
| 4.0.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 2.1.1 | 6 / 3 | |
| 2.1.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.1.2 | 7 / 3 | |
| 1.1.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 1.0.2 | 8 / 3 | |
| 1.0.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 9 / 3 |
v4.0.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'aoaioxxysz.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'aoaioxxysz.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.