definition-header
DefinitelyTyped definition header tools
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change (vvakame → leonard-thieu) occurred in 2017 as a legitimate DefinitelyTyped maintainer transition; leonard-thieu has 12 approved versions and a clean track record since. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Same 2017 maintainer transition within the DefinitelyTyped org; stable and clean record across all subsequent versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; published in 2017 when provenance attestation was not available. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.0 | 4 / 25 | |
| 0.5.0 | 4 / 25 | |
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 25 | |
| 0.3.4 | 4 / 19 | |
| 0.3.3 | 4 / 19 | |
| 0.3.2 | 4 / 19 | |
| 0.3.1 | 4 / 19 | |
| 0.3.0 | 4 / 19 | |
| 0.2.0 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 0.0.2 | 4 / 18 | |
| 0.0.1 | 4 / 18 |
v0.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-08-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-05-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-07-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-01-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-11-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.