daisyui
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:components/fab/object.js | AI (source-diff): CSS style objects with long lines; not obfuscated code. Pattern is stable for daisyUI component files. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 106)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.0.34 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.0.33 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.0.32 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.0.31 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.0.30 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.0.29 | 0 / 0 |
v5.0.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.