d3-hexbin
Group two-dimensional points into hexagonal bins.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from xaranke to mbostock (Mike Bostock, D3 creator). This is the canonical maintainer for all d3/* packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package published in 2016, before Sigstore provenance existed. Expected for this era of d3 modules. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.9 | 1 / 4 |
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-02-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.