cssstyle
An implementation of the CSSStyleDeclaration class from the CSS Object Model specification
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): domenic is the jsdom org lead; legitimate maintainer transition for this jsdom sub-package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): domenic is the jsdom org maintainer; expected addition. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.2.0 | 4 / 7 | |
| 6.1.0 | 4 / 7 | |
| 6.0.2 | 4 / 7 | |
| 6.0.1 | 4 / 7 | |
| 6.0.0 | 4 / 7 | |
| 5.3.7 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.3.6 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.3.5 | 3 / 13 | |
| 5.3.4 | 3 / 13 | |
| 5.3.3 | 3 / 13 | |
| 5.3.2 | 3 / 13 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 12 |
v6.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.3.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.3.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.