cron
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://intcreator.com/ | AI (email-domain): The 'email' field contains a URL rather than an email address — a metadata formatting issue, not a real unclaimed domain. The GitHub repo and maintainer identity are consistent and legitimate. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): intcreator is explicitly listed as a contributor in package.json; addition reflects a documented, legitimate maintainer transition. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): intcreator is a named contributor in package.json with 24 approved packages and 937 days of npm history — legitimate maintainer transition, not a takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): luxon replaces moment-timezone as a well-known, trusted date/time library. This is a documented dependency modernization, not a suspicious addition. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/luxon | AI (phantom-deps): @types/luxon is a TypeScript type package legitimately listed as a runtime dep because cron ships TypeScript declarations. This pattern is stable for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): cron legitimately uses child_process to spawn scheduled jobs — this is core functionality of the package, not a malicious indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; absence is expected for this age and ecosystem context. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.4.0 | 2 / 29 | |
| 4.3.5 | 2 / 29 | |
| 4.3.4 | 2 / 29 | |
| 4.3.3 | 2 / 30 | |
| 4.3.2 | 2 / 30 | |
| 4.3.1 | 2 / 30 | |
| 4.3.0 | 2 / 30 | |
| 4.2.0 | 2 / 30 | |
| 4.1.4 | 2 / 30 | |
| 4.1.3 | 2 / 30 | |
| 4.1.2 | 2 / 30 | |
| 4.1.1 | 2 / 29 | |
| 4.1.0 | 2 / 28 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 28 | |
| 3.5.0 | 2 / 28 | |
| 3.4.0 | 2 / 28 | |
| 3.3.2 | 2 / 28 | |
| 3.3.1 | 2 / 28 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 28 | |
| 3.2.1 | 2 / 27 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 26 | |
| 3.1.9 | 2 / 26 | |
| 3.1.8 | 2 / 26 | |
| 3.1.7 | 2 / 26 | |
| 3.1.6 | 2 / 26 | |
| 3.1.5 | 2 / 26 | |
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 25 | |
| 3.1.3 | 2 / 25 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 25 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 25 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 25 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 25 | |
| 1.7.0 | 1 / 12 |
v4.4.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://intcreator.com/' uses domain 'https://intcreator.com/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-09-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.