cp
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): 'cp' is a legitimate Unix command name for file copy; the edit-distance match to 'pg' is purely coincidental for this 2-char name. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): 'cp' is a legitimate Unix command name for file copy; the edit-distance match to 'qs' is purely coincidental for this 2-char name. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): 'cp' is a legitimate Unix command name for file copy; the edit-distance match to 'yup' is purely coincidental for this 2-char name. | ai |
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.