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Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): cookie-signature is a well-established package with 90M+ weekly downloads; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from tjholowaychuk to natevw in 2014; well-known pattern for TJ's packages. natevw is a trusted publisher. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): natevw added as maintainer in 2014 as part of TJ Holowaychuk's known package transfer pattern; stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.2.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.7 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.4 | 0 / 2 |
v1.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.