continuation-local-storage
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from othiym23 to qard occurred in 2016 and is a long-established, legitimate maintainer transition. qard has a strong track record (41 approved packages). | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): qard was added as maintainer in 2016; this is a historical, legitimate transition with no signs of compromise. qard has 41 approved packages. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): The dormancy and subsequent publish in 2016 corresponds to the known maintainer transition. No suspicious code changes accompanied the activity. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 4658 days old and predates Sigstore provenance on npm; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.1.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.1.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.1.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.1.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.6.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.6.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.6.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.5.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.5.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.5.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.4.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.4.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.4.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.4.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.4.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.3.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.3.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.3.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.3.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.3.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2.2.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.1.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 1 |
v3.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-09-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.