content-type
Create and parse HTTP Content-Type header
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/acubed | AI (email-domain): False positive: the author field contains a GitHub URL, not an email address. The 'domain' is a URL parsed incorrectly. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Legitimate transfer from deoxxa to dougwilson within jshttp org in 2015; dougwilson is the established maintainer. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of deoxxa was part of the legitimate 2015 maintainer transition. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from deoxxa to dougwilson within jshttp org in 2015; dougwilson is a trusted long-standing maintainer. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): dougwilson added as maintainer ~2015; well-established jshttp/Express ecosystem maintainer with extensive track record. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; no provenance is expected for packages from this era. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.5 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.0.4 | 0 / 8 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 8 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v2.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (deoxxa) were replaced by new maintainers (dougwilson). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-02-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/Acubed' uses domain 'https://github.com/acubed' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.