conf
Simple config handling for your app or module
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | source-size-dropped | AI (source-diff): Size reduction reflects refactoring to use external dependencies (dot-prop, env-paths, mkdirp, pkg-up) rather than bundled code; normal pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:onetime | AI (dependencies): onetime is a well-known sindresorhus utility package with wide ecosystem adoption; same trusted publisher as conf itself. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require is guarded by null-check; safely reads package.json for project name metadata. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): sindresorhus has been the sole maintainer of conf for years; this finding is an artifact of the old baseline version. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): jfd was the original early publisher; removal is expected given sindresorhus has maintained this package for years. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Legitimate transfer to sindresorhus, a prominent trusted maintainer; documented in public GitHub history. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): All new deps are well-known legitimate packages consistent with conf's config-handling purpose (schema validation, atomic writes, path resolution). Publisher sindresorhus has exceptional track record. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:debounce-fn | AI (dependencies): debounce-fn is a stable utility dependency; no security concern for conf's use case. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:env-paths | AI (dependencies): env-paths is a standard XDG/platform paths utility; legitimate dependency for config storage paths. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:atomically | AI (dependencies): atomically provides atomic file writes; essential for reliable config persistence without corruption. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): sindresorhus is a highly trusted publisher; lack of provenance attestation is not a meaningful risk signal for this author. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): conf and cors are semantically unrelated packages; false positive from edit distance heuristic. | ai |
Versions (showing 30 of 30)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.0.0 | 10 / 16 | |
| 7.0.1 | 10 / 16 | |
| 6.0.0 | 9 / 7 | |
| 5.0.0 | 7 / 7 | |
| 4.1.0 | 7 / 7 | |
| 4.0.2 | 7 / 7 | |
| 4.0.1 | 7 / 7 | |
| 4.0.0 | 7 / 7 | |
| 3.0.0 | 5 / 7 | |
| 2.2.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.1.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.4.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.3.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.3.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.2.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.1.2 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.1.1 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.1.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.12.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.11.2 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.11.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.11.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.10.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.8.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.8.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.8.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.8.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 0 |
v9.0.0
2 findingsAll previous maintainers (jfd) were replaced by new maintainers (sindresorhus). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.1
2 findingsAll previous maintainers (jfd) were replaced by new maintainers (sindresorhus). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.1
2 findingsAll previous maintainers (jfd) were replaced by new maintainers (sindresorhus). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.