compress
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Package is a ~12-year-old stub by dougwilson (Express.js maintainer); minimal metadata reflects era conventions, not spam or malice. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.99.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.99.0
2 findingsMatched 6 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_README_NO_CODE] Short README with no code block, no install instructions, and no usage/API section. • [S_NO_REPO_NO_HOME] No repository, homepage, or bugs URL — genuine packages almost always link somewhere. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 1 code file(s), 300 bytes total. • [S_EMPTY_MAIN] Entry point (index.js) is a no-op.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.