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component-type

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Type assertions aka less-broken `typeof`

6
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

timaschewanthonyshortianstormtaylornami-docclintwoodtrevorgerhardtjuliangruberthehydroimpulsedominicbarnesdfcreativemattmuellertootallnateyieldsstephenmathiesonsindresorhustjholowaychuktimoxleyjonathanongjongleberrymaxogdenqueckezz

Keywords

typeoftypetypescheckutility

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Legitimate transfer to sindresorhus, one of npm's most trusted publishers with 6600+ approved packages. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): sindresorhus is a highly trusted maintainer; this is a known pattern of adopting small utility packages. ai

Versions (showing 6 of 6)

Version Deps Published
2.0.0 0 / 2
1.2.2 0 / 0
1.2.1 0 / 0
1.2.0 0 / 0
1.1.0 0 / 0
1.0.0 0 / 0

v2.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.2.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: mattmueller → sindresorhus (on 2023-11-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-11-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.2.1

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: juliangruber → mattmueller (on 2016-03-15) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-03-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: maxogden → juliangruber (on 2015-09-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-09-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: maxogden → juliangruber (on 2014-12-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.