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component-emitter

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Simple event emitter

7
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

corehswatinemtimaschewblakeembreyanthonyshortianstormtaylornami-docclintwoodcristiandoucestagasrauchgkelonyeamasadtrevorgerhardtjuliangruberthehydroimpulsedominicbarnesdfcreativemattmuellertootallnateyieldsstephenmathiesonretrofoxsindresorhustjholowaychukhughsktimoxleyjonathanongjongleberryforbeslindesaycalvinfoqueckezzdefunctzombie

Keywords

eventemittereventsemitlistenerpubsubobserve

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Publisher change jongleberry→nami-doc occurred in 2016; package has been in stable ecosystem use for 8+ years with 18 approved dependents. Historical event, not a new risk. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer additions (dfcreative, defunctzombie) are part of the same 2016 transition; no new risk for this long-established package. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal (shtylman) is part of the 2016 transition; stable package with strong ecosystem adoption since then. ai

Versions (showing 7 of 7)

Version Deps Published
2.0.0 0 / 2
1.3.1 0 / 2
1.3.0 0 / 2
1.2.1 0 / 2
1.2.0 0 / 2
1.1.3 0 / 2
1.1.2 0 / 2

v1.3.1

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: nami-doc → sindresorhus (on 2023-11-16) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-11-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.3.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.2.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jongleberry → nami-doc (on 2016-04-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.2.0

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: tootallnate → jongleberry (on 2015-02-12) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.1.3

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: tootallnate → juliangruber (on 2014-06-20) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.1.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.