common-services
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:hex-decode | AI (semgrep): Hex decoding used for IV parsing in symmetric encryption — legitimate cryptographic usage, not payload hiding. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:knifecycle | AI (dependencies): knifecycle is the author's own DI framework; same publisher nfroidure with clean track record. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 20.0.0 | 3 / 21 | |
| 19.0.0 | 3 / 21 | |
| 18.0.1 | 3 / 22 | |
| 18.0.0 | 3 / 22 |
v20.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v19.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.