combined-stream
A stream that emits multiple other streams one after another.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from felixge to apechimp occurred in 2015; apechimp is a long-standing maintainer with clean track record. Legitimate transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): apechimp added as maintainer ~2015; long-standing legitimate co-maintainer of combined-stream. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package published in 2015, before Sigstore/provenance existed. Expected for this era. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.8 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.7 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.7 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 1 |
v1.0.7
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: alexindigo.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-06-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-10-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.