collect-mentions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is explained by addition of ascjs build pipeline producing a dist/ directory alongside src/. No obfuscation or injected payload. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from olstenlarck to tunnckocore is a known identity rebrand by the same developer (Charlike Mike Reagent). Not a compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): tunnckocore is the same person as olstenlarck (Charlike Mike Reagent); addition is a self-rebrand, not a third-party addition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): olstenlarck removal is part of a self-rebrand to tunnckocore by the same developer. No hostile actor involved. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): olstenlarck and tunnckocore are the same person (Charlike Mike Reagent) using different npm handles. This is a self-transfer, not a hostile takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Publisher migrated to bun-based toolchain; missing gitHead reflects environment change, not a malicious publish. Stable pattern for this package going forward. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package from a trusted publisher; lack of Sigstore provenance is a toolchain gap, not a security risk for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Package has a real description, keywords, repository URL, and runtime dependency. Bogus-package signals are false positives for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 3 |
v2.0.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: tunnckocore.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: tunnckocore.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (olstenlarck) were replaced by new maintainers (tunnckocore). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-07-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (olstenlarck) were replaced by new maintainers (tunnckocore). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-07-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.