codecov.io
lcov posting to codecov.io
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is the legitimate initial version of this 11-year-old codecov.io package by its original author; not indicative of malicious intent. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:request | AI (dependencies): request is a well-known, widely-used HTTP library. Its use here is appropriate for the package's purpose and poses no malicious risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 4244 days old; lack of Sigstore provenance is expected for packages of this age and is not a security concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.8 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.0 | 1 / 5 |
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.