code
assertion library
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from hueniverse to cjihrig reflects the documented 2018 hapi.js ecosystem maintainer transition; cjihrig is a well-known Node.js/hapi contributor. Stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 30 of 30)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 5.2.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 5.2.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 5.2.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 5.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 5.1.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 5.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 5.0.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 4.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.3.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.5.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 1 / 1 |
v5.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-11-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-11-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.2.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-10-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-09-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-06-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-09-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.