closure-compiler
Bindings to Google's Closure Compiler
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from tim-smart to mprobst occurred in 2015; mprobst has 17 approved versions and a long track record. Legitimate historical transition, not a compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): mprobst was added as maintainer in 2015 and has maintained the package for ~10 years with 17 approved versions. Stable, legitimate maintainer. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:google-closure-compiler | AI (phantom-deps): google-closure-compiler is a runtime dependency used via shell/spawn rather than direct require(); expected pattern for a Java-based compiler wrapper. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): closure-compiler spawns a Java process to run the Closure Compiler JAR — child_process usage is the core, documented mechanism of this package and stable across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by many years; absence is expected for this legacy package. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.12 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-10-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-10-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-09-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-07-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.