cli-table3
Pretty unicode tables for the command line. Based on the original cli-table.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package is well-established with clean diff vs prior version; missing gitHead reflects a publish environment change but no other risk signals are present. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with clean history; lack of Sigstore attestation is a process gap, not a security risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): danielruf is an established npm account (4 approved packages, 1565 days history) taking over the cli-table org; transition appears legitimate and stable going forward. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): danielruf added as maintainer is consistent with a legitimate org-level handoff; account has a clean track record. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.5 | 1 / 8 | |
| 0.6.4 | 1 / 8 | |
| 0.6.3 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.6.2 | 1 / 8 | |
| 0.6.1 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.5.1 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 12 |
v0.6.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: speedytwenty.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: turbo87.
v0.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.