cli-table
Pretty unicode tables for the CLI
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:colors | AI (dependencies): [email protected] is a pinned, stable version of a common utility library; no security concern for this package's context. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance absence is common across npm ecosystem; not a disqualifier for a mature, established package with clean metadata. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.11 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 0 |
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.